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ABSTRACT
SECURITY ISSUES IN NETWORKED EMBEDDED DEVICES
MAY 2012
DANAI CHASAKI
Diploma, NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS, GREECE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Tilman Wolf
Embedded devices are ubiquitous; they are present in various sectors of everyday life:
smart homes, automobiles, health care, telephony, industrial automation, networking etc.
Embedded systems are well known for their dependability, and that is one of the reasons
that they are preferred over general purpose machines in various applications. Traditional
embedded computing is changing nowadays mainly due to the increasing number of het-
erogeneous embedded devices that are, more often than not, interconnected. Security in
the field of networked embedded systems is becoming particularly important, because:
 Connected embedded devices can be attacked remotely.
 They are resource constrained.
This means, that due to their limited computational capabilities, a full-blown operating
system that runs virus scanners and advanced intrusion detection techniques cannot be
v
supported. The two facts lead us to the conclusion that a new set of vulnerabilities emerges
in the networked embedded system area, which cannot be tackled using traditional security
solutions.
This work is focused on embedded systems that are used in the network domain. A very
exciting instance of an embedded system that requires high performance, has limited pro-
cessing resources and communicates with other embedded devises is a network processor
(NP). Powerful network processors are central components of modern routers, which help
them achieve flexibility and perform tasks with advanced processing requirements. In my
work, I identified a new class of vulnerabilities specific to routers. The same set of vulner-
abilities can apply to any other type of networked embedded device that is not traditionally
programmable, but is gradually shifting towards programmability.
Security in the networking field is a crucial concern. Many attacks in existing net-
works are based on security vulnerabilities in end-systems or in the end-to-end protocols
that they use. Inside the network, most practical attacks have focused on the control plane
where routing information and other control data are exchanged. With the emergence of
router systems that use programmable embedded processors, the data plane of the network
also becomes a potential target for attacks. This trend towards attacks on the forward-
ing component in router systems is likely to speed up in next-generation networks, where
virtualization requires even higher levels of programmability in the data path.
This dissertation demonstrates a real attack scenario on a programmable router and
discusses how similar attacks can be realized. Specifically, we present an attack example
that can launch a devastating denial-of-service attack by sending just a single packet. We
show that vulnerable packet processing code can be exploited on a Click modular router as
well as on a custom packet processor on the NetFPGA platform. Several defenses to target
this specific type of attacks are presented, which are broadly applicable to a large scale
of embedded devices. Security vulnerabilities can be addressed efficiently using hardware
based extensions. For example, defense techniques based on processor monitoring can help
vi
in detecting and avoiding such attacks. We believe that this work is an important step at
providing comprehensive security solutions that can protect the data path of current and
future networks.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Future of Embedded Systems
Embedded systems are entering a new era of innovation, their potential use has grown
so much that most microprocessor designs currently target this market. Embedded devices
are becoming ubiquitous; they range from gateways to IP phones, smart buildings, auto-
mobile parts, portable medical devices, health care records, sensors, transportation devices,
industrial automation, etc. There is a new term describing the way that all these embedded
systems communicate and connect to the Internet, called “the Internet of things”. Trends
show that in the near future 15 billion embedded devices will be connected [20], and tra-
ditional micro-controllers have given way to heterogeneous networked devices. Critical
characteristics of embedded devices are dependability (reliability), real time response, high
performance and optimization for dedicated functions. However, the vision of how to use
networked embedded devices in the future cannot be realized without security in the “In-
ternet of things”.
1.1.1 Networked Embedded Systems Security
Security in the field of networked embedded systems is of critical importance because
these interconnected devices can be remotely hacked [30]. However, the limited resources
of embedded devices do not allow a full operating system to run virus scanners and the
network cannot afford firewalls and advanced intrusion detection systems. Therefore, a
new set of vulnerabilities emerges in the networked embedded system area that cannot be
tackled using traditional security solutions. Since hackers will always exist, and will likely
1
become smarter, it is essential to identify such vulnerabilities early and implement custom
solutions against potential harmful interactions among the connected devices.
1.2 Security of Embedded Devices in Networks
This dissertation identifies a new class of vulnerabilities specific to embedded systems
in the network domain, specifically on router systems that use programmable embedded
processors. Several defenses are also developed to target this specific type of attacks, which
are broadly applicable to a large class of embedded devices.
1.2.1 Network Security
The Internet is a critical component of modern communication infrastructure. While se-
curity concerns were not a priority during the design of the Internet [11], society’s reliance
on the Internet today requires that the network be protected from malicious attackers. Thus,
it is essential that the network architecture is extended to integrate the core principles of
information security specified by the CIA triad of confidentiality, integrity, and availabil-
ity [48].
End-to-end security protocols have been developed to provide confidentiality and in-
tegrity (e.g., Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols). However, providing assurance
of availability is a more challenging problem as it involves the entire network infrastruc-
ture. In the current Internet, there are very few techniques available to protect the net-
work from denial-of-service attacks (even for nation states [24]). Since most large-scale
denial-of-service attacks are of a distributed nature and generated by botnets [18], defense
mechanisms aim to prevent end-system intrusion and thus to limit access to platforms from
which attacks can be launched. Widely deployed intrusion prevention systems include fire-
walls [32] and deep packet inspection [47].
Most network security efforts have focused on vulnerable end-systems that are ex-
ploited by remote attacks through the network, on denial-of-service attacks that use the
2
network to disable end-systems, and on general information security. Intrusion prevention
mechanisms (and thus defenses against denial-of-service attacks) target end-systems. Until
recently, the network infrastructure itself has not been a major concern for network security
since it presented no practical attack target. However, there are several important trends in
networking that indicate that such defenses are insufficient against novel attacks that target
vulnerabilities in the data plane of the network infrastructure itself. New vulnerabilities of
modern routers are emerging because the technology used to implement these core network
components has changed in recent years.
1.2.2 Programmability in the Data Path of Networks
In the past, most high-performance network routers used application-specific integrated
circuits (ASICs) to implement packet forwarding functions. While ASICs are costly to de-
velop, they represented the only technology that could achieve the performance that was
necessary for multi-Gigabit per second traffic forwarding. Over the last few years, how-
ever, the performance of general-purpose multi-core processors (e.g., network processors
or high-end server processors) has reached a level where high traffic forwarding rates can be
achieved. Since the functionality of an ASIC cannot be changed once it has been designed,
the use of general-purpose processor provides a router vendor with much more flexibility to
adjust a router’s functionality after production [14]. Therefore, there is an ongoing shift in
the industry toward developing routers based on programmable packet processing engines
rather than based on ASICs.
Modern networks use numerous devices that are based on programmable components
in the data path:
 High-performance router implementations use embedded multi-core processing sys-
tems (i.e., network processors) for packet forwarding to accommodate advanced data
plane functions [14]. On these systems, packet forwarding is implemented as soft-
ware operations on general-purpose processor cores.
3
 Recent clean-slate network architectures consider various new protocols and data
communication paradigms. To accommodate networks with different protocol stacks
on a single network infrastructure, network virtualization has been proposed [2, 50].
Since network slices are deployed dynamically on a virtualized network substrate, the
routers in the substrate need to be able to support custom packet processing functions.
This programmability can be achieved using network processors [52] or operating
system virtualization on conventional workstation processors [25].
1.2.3 New Vulnerabilities in Modern Routers
A side-effect of this shift fromASIC-based routers to routers with programmable packet
processors is that it gives rise to a new class of vulnerabilities and corresponding attacks.
Routers based on ASICs represented no practical attack target since their functionality
could not be changed except by replacing actual hardware. In contrast, routers based on
general-purpose processors that run software to implement packet processing functions ex-
hibit the same kind of vulnerabilities that have been observed and exploited in conventional
end-systems and embedded systems: attackers can attempt to crash the system, change its
operation, extract information, etc. A study of vulnerabilities in network devices in the
current Internet indicates that there are large numbers of potential attack targets [12].
Vulnerabilities in the network infrastructure itself are particularly problematic. First,
routers are shared infrastructure and outages can affect a large number of users. Second,
some routers at the core of the network are connected to links with extremely high data
rates. If an attacker can modify the behavior of a router to send out malicious traffic, devas-
tating denial-of-service attacks can be launched using only one or a handful of vulnerable
systems. When considering the potential impact of a denial-of-service attack that is ini-
tiated from a core router that is connected to dozens of links with 40 Gbps data rates, it
becomes clear that there is a need to protect these systems.
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1.3 Contribution
In our work, we demonstrate a practical example of a novel type of attack that exploits
these vulnerabilities and thereby attacks the network infrastructure itself. Specifically, we
demonstrate how benign protocol processing code (in our case, the insertion of a proto-
col header) can be exploited by a single data packet and trigger a denial-of-service that
consumes the entire outgoing link bandwidth of a router [9]. We show this vulnerability
for two specific systems, a Click modular router [23] and a custom packet processor [57]
based on the NetFPGA platform [26], as representatives for the broad class of routers with
programmable packet processors.
We also show that processor monitoring techniques can help in identifying and mit-
igating these attacks. We present a design and results from a prototype implementation
of a secure packet processor [8]. This packet processor can perform custom packet for-
warding functions to support a wide range of protocols. A special processing monitor is
used to track the instruction-level operations of each processor core. These operations are
compared to a representative model of the packet processing task that has been obtained
through offline analysis of the packet processing binary. Under normal conditions, the op-
erations reported by the processor match the model in the monitor. If an intrusion attack
occurs that changes the operations of the processor (e.g., to execute malicious code), then
these operations no longer match the model in the monitor. The secure packet processor
can detect these conditions and initiate a recovery step that resets the processor core and
allows continued operation.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of this secure processor design by presenting results
from an implementation on a NetFPGA platform. The prototype can detect an example
attack where the control flow of the packet processor deviates from that in the original
processing binary. The system can correctly detect this attack, halt the processor, drop
the packet, and restore the system within 6 instruction cycles. This very small time for
recovery allows our secure packet processor to operate at full data rate even when under
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attack. The overhead for adding a monitoring system to the packet processor is very small
(0.8% increase on slice LUTs and 5.6% on memory elements).
The specific contributions of this dissertation are:
 To our knowledge, the first practical example of a novel type of attack on routers
with programmable packet processors,
 A prototype implementation and evaluation of the attack on a Click modular router
system and on a custom network processor based on the NetFPGA platform, and
 A discussion of mitigation techniques, including processor monitors.
 The design of a secure packet processor that uses existing monitoring techniques to
detect the effects of an intrusion attack. The system can quickly recover from such
attacks by resetting the processor system.
 A prototype implementation of this processing system on a NetFPGA platform. The
processor core is based on a Plasma core that is extended with our monitoring and
recovery system.
 Results from the operation of the prototype system that illustrate the correct detection
of an attack and the fast recovery mechanism that allows the system to run at full
speed even under attack.
We believe that this work presents an important first step towards designing router sys-
tems that provide the necessary flexibility in packet processing but also provide sufficient
security mechanisms to protect modern network infrastructure.
1.4 Organization of Dissertation
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 discusses related work on current and next-generation network security.
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In Chapter 3, the basic characteristics of embedded processors in modern routers are
introduced. This chapter provides key concepts related to the architecture and the program-
ming model of a modern router that is based on a multi-core grid of embedded processors.
Here, the design and implementation of a custom packet processor prototype are described,
while special attention is given to the performance and scalability of this system.
Chapter 4 is an overview of the security problems that arise due to the programmability
in the data plane of networks. These are vulnerabilities that target the network infrastructure
itself, and can have a larger impact than common attacks on end systems.
A specific attack example is presented in Chapter 5. Results from an implementation
of the attack in a real network setup are shown in Section 5.2.
Chapter 6 presents a discussion of defense mechanisms against this type of attacks.
Section 6.1 introduces the design of a secure packet processor while Section 6.2 presents
the prototype implementation of the secure system. Section 6.4 presents an alternative
defense mechanism, which is ideal for multi-core packet processor in terms of accuracy
and resource requirements.
Chapter 7 outlines my future research directions, summarizes and concludes the disser-
tation.
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CHAPTER 2
RELATEDWORK
Programmability in the data plane of routers is widely used and many modern routers
use programmable packet processors to implement protocol processing. Routers that use
software for packet processing include workstation-based routers [19, 23], programmable
routers [43], and virtualized router platforms [2]. High-performance router systems use
multi-core packet processors (so-called “network processors”) [6, 49]. Commercial ex-
amples of network processors are the Intel IXP2400 [21], the EZchip NP-3 [16], the LSI
APP [27], the Cavium Octeon [7], and the Cisco QuantumFlow [10]. The number of pro-
cessor cores in these chips ranges from as little as eight in the IXP2400 to over a hundred
in the Cisco Silicon Packet Processor (SPP).
Addressing the problem of vulnerabilities in routers is also important in the context
of research on the design of the future Internet [17, 35, 36]. The use of programmable
packet processors is at the core of many future Internet designs (e.g., network virtualization
[2, 50]). Thus, developing defense mechanisms to protect the packet processors in router
systems is critical for the continued success of the Internet.
Network security research has focused on topics ranging from secure end-to-end pro-
tocols to anomaly detection heuristics [15]. To protect networks and end-systems from
denial-of-service attacks, packet marking strategies have been proposed to identify spoofed
sources [45]. Capabilities-based networks require positive authentication of traffic before
forwarding is performed [5]. Extensions protect from denial-of-capabilities attacks [38]
and provide one-hop containment [54]. These approaches defend against the effects of
denial-of-service attacks.
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The vast majority of security issues in networking are related to end-systems and proto-
cols. One example is large-scale distributed denial-of-service attacks, which are generated
by botnets [18]. Large scale DoS attacks have been previously studied in the context of
worms [33]. Worms can spread quickly by infecting a large number of vulnerable end-
systems and can absorb a large amount of network bandwidth. The key difference of the
attack that we describe in this work is that it has an even more devastating effect: The attack
is triggered with a single packet, absorbs all bandwidth of the outgoing link on the router,
and can propagate to all vulnerable downstream routers.
The premise of a denial-of-service attack is that an attacker has a large number of sys-
tems from which traffic can be directed to a target. Therefore, an attacker needs to gain
control over a large number of systems. This access is accomplished through intrusion
techniques (e.g., trojan horse, etc.) that make the system (or parts of it) remotely con-
trollable. From the network side, firewalls [32] and deep packet inspection [47] try to
control end-system intrusion and thus limit the access to platforms from which attacks can
be launched. On end-systems, virus scanner software can also identify some attacks. Se-
cure protocols (e.g., IPsec [22]) are used to provide basic information security, including
authentication and privacy.
Very little work has addressed security issues in the network infrastructure itself. A
recent study [12] surveyed network devices that are considered vulnerable due to exposed
administrative interfaces, which are part of the control plane of the network and can be
protected by better management methods. In our work, we consider the data plane of the
network, which inherently needs to be exposed and thus needs novel protection techniques.
One such protection is based on processor monitoring, originally proposed for embedded
systems in general [29] and recently adapted for network systems in our work [8]. Other
defenses may be based on techniques from embedded system security [37].
While exploiting software vulnerabilities has been studied extensively on a range of
different systems, it is important to note that packet processing systems on network routers
9
present unique challenges. Packet processors are highly parallel processor systems that
typically do not run conventional operating systems. Also, the characteristics of a packet
processing workload is fundamentally different (i.e., very simple and highly repetitive [41])
from what is encountered in other domains.
The use of virus scanner software as a defense against intrusion assumes that a suf-
ficiently powerful processor and operating system are available. This assumption does
not hold when considering embedded packet processors on routers. These systems fre-
quently use network processors that operate without operating system support to maximize
throughput performance. These embedded processing systems are vulnerable to intrusion
just as conventional end-systems are [12]. Our work focuses on methods to protect these
packet processors through hardware extensions that do not impact the overall processing
performance.
We use processing monitors to track the operations on the packet processor. The mon-
itor can determine if attacks occur because the processor’s operations deviate from the
operations that are valid (as determined by offline analysis of the processing binary). The
techniques we use have been developed in prior work by us and others for the use in embed-
ded systems in general [28]. Like network processors, embedded systems are characterized
by the lack of operating system support for intrusion detection (and often the lack of per-
formance to do so in software). Our previously designed hardware monitor for embedded
systems can track each instruction of the processor and compare it to the processing model
used by the monitor [28]. Other monitors [3, 39] use similar techniques, but operate at
the granularity of basic blocks and thus are slower in detecting attacks. Similarly, the sys-
tem in [60] determines correct operation across blocks of instructions. Other techniques
extend the processor instruction set and micro-architecture to support special verification
steps [34, 40]. Our approach differs from related work in that it does not require changes
to the processing binary (which is beneficial for third-party code) and that attacks can be
detected within a few instructions rather than at the end of a longer code block.
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Our idea of using monitoring techniques to protect networking systems was first pub-
lished in [55]. In this work, we make these general ideas more concrete by presenting a
detailed design of the processing monitor and results from a prototype implementation on a
NetFPGA system. The NetFPGA platform contains a Virtex2-Pro FPGA device and is used
for experimental purposes in the networking domain. This work provides the first definite
evidence that the proposed system can indeed detect and recover from attacks and can do
so at speeds that do not degrade overall throughput performance. This last point is partic-
ularly important since the recovery mechanism should not present a target for a new type
of denial-of-service attack where a single malicious packet can trigger time-consuming
recovery operations.
Alternatively, programmable logic can be used in conjunction with the network proces-
sor in the router to detect attacks. The idea of augmenting fixed “hard” processors with
on-chip programmable logic to achieve improved system efficiency has gained increasing
acceptance in recent years. Recently, Intel announced the on-chip integration of an Altera
FPGA core with an Atom processor [31] and several studies have examined techniques to
embed a small amount of FPGA logic in an otherwise non-reconfigurable hardware plat-
form [51]. The use of reconfigurable logic in network hardware is likely to increase given
recent work [59] showing the benefits of using dynamic reconfiguration of programmable
logic in adapting network router functionality.
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CHAPTER 3
EMBEDDED PROCESSORS IN NETWORKS
Before we talk about vulnerabilities and potential attacks in the network infrastruc-
ture, we first describe key architectural concepts of network processors, which are essential
components at the core of the network. We also briefly describe the design of a custom
four-core packet processor, which was implemented in the Network Systems Lab at the
University of Massachusetts Amherst, and is a part of my joint work with Dr. Qiang Wu.
Based on this design we demonstrate an example of a DoS attack (in Chapter 5), and we
evaluate our proposed hardware extensions for security provisioning (in Chapter 6).
3.1 Programmability
Modern routers use programmable packet processors on each port to implement packet
forwarding and other advanced protocol functionality. The ability to change a router’s
operation by simply changing the software processed on router ports makes it possible
to introduce new functions (e.g., monitoring, accounting, anomaly detection, blocking,
etc.) without changing router hardware. An essential requirement for these systems is the
availability of a high-performance packet processor that can deliver packet processing at
data rates of multiple Gigabits per second. Such network processors (NPs) can be deployed
as systems-on-a-chip based on multi-core architectures.
One of the key challenges in using a network processor to implement advanced packet
processing functionality is software development. Many programming environments for
NPs use very low levels of abstractions. While this approach helps with achieving high
throughput performance, it also poses considerable challenges to the software developer.
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Distributing processing workload between processor cores, coordinating shared resources,
and manually allocating data structures to different memory types and banks is a difficult
process. In environments where network functionality does not change frequently, it is
conceivable to dedicate considerable resources to such software development. However,
this software development approach becomes less practical in highly dynamic systems.
The next-generation Internet is envisioned to be such a dynamic environment.
The next-generation Internet architecture is expected to rely on programmability in
the infrastructure substrate to provide isolated network “slices” with functionally different
protocol stacks [2,50]. In such a network, the processing workload on a router changes dy-
namically as slices are added or removed or as the amount of traffic within a slice changes.
These dynamics require that the software on a network processor adapt at runtime without
the involvement of a software developer. Thus, it is necessary to develop network pro-
cessing systems where these dynamics can be handled by the system. The performance
demands of packet processing do not allow the use of a completely general operating sys-
tem. An operating system would use a considerable fraction of the network processor’s
resources. Instead, we focus on a solution where resource management is built into the
network processor hardware and in turn allows a much simplified programming process.
We built a simplified network processor that attempts to hide the complexity of resource
management in the network processor hardware. The software developer merely programs
the functionality of packet processing. This approach contrasts other network processors,
where functionality and resource management are tightly coupled (e.g., programmers need
to explicitly choose allocation of data in SRAM or DRAM). By separating functionality
from resource management, the system can more readily adapt to runtime conditions that
could not have been predicted by the software developer.
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3.2 Design Challenges
When designing a packet processing system, a design choice needs to be made on how
complex a core processor is. More complex processors typically perform processing faster.
However, they also require more hardware resources (memory, logic, interconnects) and
consume more power. Assuming a fixed resource budget, a design can use either a larger
number of simpler processors or a smaller number of larger processors. Using a larger
number of simpler processor for packet processors provides several advantages specific to
the networking domain:
 Higher throughput: Network processors are concerned with the throughput of the
system (i.e., total amount of processing across all processors) rather than per-packet
delay (i.e., executing speed of single processing task). A larger number of lower-
performing processors achieves an overall higher throughput since the cost for speed-
ing up single-thread performance is disproportionate to the performance gain. (Note
that the processing delay on a router – even when performing complex tasks on a slow
processor – is typically considerably less than the propagation delay encountered on
transmission links. Thus, increasing delay for higher throughput is acceptable.)
 Lower power consumption: Following the argument for higher throughput, a sys-
tem with more lower-speed processors consumes less power while achieving higher
processing performance.
 Easier support for virtualization: It is convenient to provide isolation between slices
at the level of a processor rather than attempting to achieve isolation of processing
tasks within a processor. Having a larger number of processors available provides
the basis for finer-grained resource allocation than is possible with a few large pro-
cessors.
However, there are also several challenges when using a larger number of simpler pro-
cessors. In particular, the management of these resources becomes more complex. Never-
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theless, using a larger number of smaller processors is preferable when considering perfor-
mance.
Another challenge in a packet processing system is to ensure that each packet process-
ing function has access to data it needs. There are different types of data and information
that are used for network processing:
 Packet processing program code: The instructions for processing a packet are typi-
cally stored in a dedicated instruction store.
 Packet data: The packet header and often the packet payload needs to be accessible
to the packet processing function.
 Flow state: Many packet processing functions are not entirely stateless but maintain
a small amount of per-flow state.
 Local processing state: This state encompasses temporary memory used by the packet
processing function.
 Global processing state: This state information encompasses global per-function
state as well as system-wide global state.
We use the term “context” to refer to the set of all these data and state information
that are specific to one particular packet. In a typical implementation of packet processing
systems, a processing function that tries to access this context needs to explicitly find the
correct memory locations where it is stored. Such a manual management of packet pro-
cessing context can lead to difficulties when programming packet processing functions and
can also consume considerable processing resources. Instead, our packet processor design
is based on providing hardware context management.
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 Figure 3.1. Processing context in simplified network processor design.
3.3 Software Development
In principle, a network processor consists of a grid of packet processors that are locally
connected to each other. A control system determines how packets are moved between
processors and what processing is performed. Using hardware support for moving pack-
ets between processor cores and switching processing contexts enables us to significantly
simplify the software development process. Since the software developer does not need to
explicitly manage packets or processing context, a much simpler processing environment
can be presented. Through careful memory management, processing instructions, data
structures, and the current packet can all be mapped to (virtually) fixed memory locations.
Thus, the program can simply access them through static references.
Figure 3.1 illustrates this simplified environment. To achieve the desired simplicity, the
packet processor is able to directly access on-chip memories, in which instructions (pro-
gram code for multiple services), data and packets have been stored. The packet processor
has an interface for reading program instructions and data memory and an interface for ac-
cess to packet memory. In the instruction memory, the code for running a particular service
is placed at a fixed, well-known offset. In the data memory we have placed the stack and
global pointers at well-known offsets as well. With this design, packet processing and code
development for packet processing is simplified. Packet data can be accessed via referenc-
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#define IP_TTL 0x1000001E
#define pkt_get8(addr, data) \
data = *((volatile unsigned char *) addr)
#define pkt_put8(addr, data) \
*((volatile unsigned char *) addr) = data
typedef unsigned char _u8;
_u8 ip_ttl;
pkt_get8(IP_TTL, ip_ttl);
if (ip_ttl != 0){
ip_ttl--; \\decrement TTL
pkt_put8(IP_TTL, ip_ttl);
} else {
...handle TTL expiration...
}
Figure 3.2. Simple C program for accessing and decrementing the time-to-live field in the
IP header.
ing the data memory on the (fixed) packet offset. Moreover, the program code is placed in
a fixed location in the instruction memory and thus can be accessed easily by the processor.
An example of a piece of C code that accesses packet memory is shown in Figure 6.5.
The code reads the time-to-live (TTL) field in the IP header and decrements it. Since
the context is automatically mapped, the IP header can simply be accessed by a static
reference. The hardware of the system ensures that this memory access is mapped to the
correct physical address in the packet buffer that is currently in use. Similarly, data memory
(and instruction memory) can be accessed. For example, to count the number of packets
handled by an application, a simple counter can be declared:
static int packet_count
This counter can be incremented once per packet:
packet_count++
The automated context handling ensures that the memory state is maintained for the appli-
cation across packets, and thus correct counting is possible.
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 Figure 3.3. Network processing platform design.
3.4 Prototype Implementation
The high-level architecture of our four-core prototype system, which we have imple-
mented on a NetFPGA [26], is shown in Figure 3.3. Packets enter through the I/O interface,
get classified into flows and then distributed into the grid of packet processing units. Each
processing unit has a set of packet processing applications preloaded (as determined by the
runtime system), and is able to select the requested application based on control informa-
tion determined during packet classification. Example applications could be IP-forwarding,
IPsec, payload transcoding, privacy services, QoS, etc. After the processing steps have
been completed, the packet is sent through the output arbiter to the outgoing interface. The
processor core is a 32-bit Plasma processor [42], which uses the MIPS instruction set and
operates at 62.5MHz.
One of the key design aspects of this system is that packet processors only use local
memory. Avoiding the use of a global, shared memory interface helps in preserving the
scalability of the design. As we show in the results in Section 3.5, the prototype implemen-
tation can scale to a 77 grid configuration with a linear increase in chip resources.
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Table 3.1. IP forwarding throughput.
number small packets large packets
of cores Mbps kpps Mbps kpps
1 154 302 2792 231
2 169 320 2769 229
3 167 327 2776 229
4 171 333 2785 230
3.5 Performance
In this section, we discuss performance results obtained from our prototype system.
These results focus on throughput, performance, and scalability.
To evaluate the processing performance of the system, we consider the common IP
forwarding application.
The throughput results for IP forwarding demonstrate the overall throughput perfor-
mance of the prototype system. Table 3.1 shows the forwarding performance for small
packets (64 bytes) and large packet (1512 bytes). For large packets, our network processor
can achieve a peak forwarding rate of 2.79 Gigabits per second with only a single core. For
small packets, the forwarding rate drops due to the per-packet overhead.
Note that our prototype is built on an FPGA-based system, which is convenient for pro-
totyping, but not realistic for deployment in a real network. The clock rate of the processor
units is only 62.5MHz. Achieving several Gigabits per second forwarding performance on
such a system is a considerable achievement. In a realistic deployment, an ASIC-based
implementation with considerably higher clock rates would be used. Thus, the forwarding
performance would scale up accordingly.
To evaluate the scalability of our system architecture, we synthesized different configu-
rations of our design on a larger FPGA (Virtex 5 XC5VLX330T). The increase in resource
consumption scales with the number of processing units. The amount of registers, lookup
tables, and flip-flops per processing unit is shown in Figure 3.4. The nearly constant val-
ues across all configurations indicate that our system can be scaled to large configuration
without bottlenecks.
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Figure 3.4. Resource estimation per processing unit on Virtex 5.
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Thus, we believe that our simplified network processor system can provide ease of use
as well as the necessary performance to support packet processing in the networks of today
and the future.
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CHAPTER 4
VULNERABILITIES AND ATTACKS IN NETWORK
INFRASTRUCTURE
Before discussing the details of our specific attack in Chapter 5, we provide a brief
overview of the vulnerabilities and potential attacks in the network infrastructure.
4.1 Attack Classification
The main functionality of the Internet (and any other data communication network) is
to allow end-systems to communicate. As such, the Internet has served as a vehicle for
many attacks where malicious users have gained unauthorized access to end-systems for
the purpose of hacking, espionage, etc. In addition to such attacks that target access to
data on end-systems, there are also denial-of-service attacks that aim to make end-systems
temporarily inaccessible.
While attacks on end-systems are often highly visible due to news media attention,
there are are also several other types of attacks on other components of the network. These
attack types are shown in Figure 4.1 together with a few examples and common defense
mechanisms. This figure by no means contains a comprehensive list of attacks and de-
fenses, but merely a selection that helps in illustrating major differences in attack types.
The control plane of the network, where routing information and other control information
is exchanged, is a target of attacks that aim to disrupt the correct operation of the network
(e.g., by stealthily redirecting traffic to malicious end-systems). In the data plane of the
network, where the actual network traffic is transmitted between end-systems and routers,
attackers may aim to eavesdrop on or intercept communications. It is here where a new
type of attack that can lead to denial-of-service is emerging.
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 Figure 4.1. Examples of network attacks and defenses.
The attack on the data plane of the network that aims at denial of service is the main
focus of this work. As explained in Chapter 1, this attack is rooted in the way modern
routers are implemented. Until a few years ago, practically all high-performance routers
used ASICs to implement packet forwarding operations. The function of an ASIC cannot
be changed after it has been created and thus there was no way to change the forwarding
operation of a router for the purpose of a network attack. However, the recent development
of high-performance MPSoCs that are specialized for packet processing (i.e., network pro-
cessors) has shifted router designs from ASIC-based packet forwarding to software-based
forwarding on general-purpose processing systems [7, 10, 14, 53]. As with any software-
based system, the flexibility provided by programmability also presents a security challenge
as attackers can change the operation of the system for malicious purposes.
4.2 Commercial Routers with Programmable Features
Since attacks on the data plane of networks hinge on the presence of programmable
packet processing systems in routers, we provide a brief overview of commercial router
products. We show that programmable packet processors are indeed widely used in the
Internet. Thus, these routers present the potential for the types of attacks we discuss in this
dissertation. However, we do not want to imply that any specific products are vulnerable to
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any specific attack. We merely want to show that the technology that is the basis for these
attacks (i.e., programmable packet processors) is commonly used.
Modern Internet routers for the network core and the network edge typically employ
programmable packet processors. This trend can be seen by examining the router products
from two of the leading router equipment manufactures:
 Cisco: The Cisco CRS-1 core router uses a Cisco Silicon Packet Processor (SPP).
The SPP is a 188-core processor that can be programmed to execute multiple ad-
vanced networking services. Cisco CRS-3is based on the 40-core Cisco Quantum
Flow processor which also supports high level of parallelization and flexibility in
terms of implementable services. Edge routers like the Cisco ASR 1000 and 9000
series are built on Quantum Flow as well. They are commonly used for applications
that require parallel processing, security provisioning, QoS mechanisms and virtual-
ization. The processors support any combination of layer 2 and layer 3 services and
features. This is the most representative type of router for our work because services
are programmed in pure C.
 Juniper: Juniper J and SRX series as well as Juniper MX series are used by both
service providers and enterprise networks. They are designed on network processors
e.g. Intel IXP models, which can efficiently implement services like load balancing,
SSL offload, web acceleration, application security, access control et.c.
If we were to guess how an attacker would go about identifying vulnerabilities in mod-
ern routers and eventually exploiting them, it is natural to first consider the ways in which
exploits have emerged in workstations.
Looking at recent attacks on Windows machines (e.g. Stuxnet worm 2010, Stateless
Address Auto Configuration (SLAAC) attack 2011), we would have to think about the
following questions:
 When was the attack first discovered?
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 Was it first published or launched?
 How did the users become aware of it?
 When and how was it resolved?
 What was the vulnerability the attack was based on?
 What did the attacker know about the system/software in order to succeed with the
exploit?
 Did the exploit require insider information?
Common causes of workstation attacks, which could very well apply to commercial
routers are:
 Connectivity: Physical or virtual access to the system, increased privileges to sim-
plify system operation
 Well-known Code: Software development based on common, well-known routines
that an attacker might have encountered in other systems
 Dangerous input: All incoming packets/user input are not safe. There should be some
sort of input validation in all systems.
 Absence of self-learning techniques: Systems should be able to remember past at-
tacks and learn to drop dangerous input that has caused misbehavior in the past.
In order to hypothesize and predict how an actual attack can be realized on a commercial
router, it would be helpful to work with major networking companies and discuss if they
follow a specific process to identify potential attacks, how they resolve the issue once they
discover it, how frequently they update their routers’ firmware etc.
25
4.3 Security Model for Network Infrastructure
In our work, we use a straightforward security model that reflects the operation of the
current Internet. Basically, we assume that the packet processing code on a router is benign
(i.e., not intentionally malicious) and an attacker aims to exploit vulnerabilities in this code
to change the operation of a router.
4.3.1 Security Requirements
The basic security requirement in our model is that the operation of the router does
not change under attack. The infrastructure attacks we discuss here (see Figure 4.1) rely
on the ability of an attacker to change the behavior of the packet processor (i.e., change
in control flow or instruction memory) or its data (i.e., change in data memory). It is
important to note that in most attack scenarios a modification of behavior is necessary even
when modification of or access to data is the ultimate goal of the attack. This leads to two
main security requirements that ensure that the router continues to perform correct protocol
processing: (1) Benign packets should be processed according to protocol specifications
without interference from possible attacks; (2) Malicious traffic should be identified and be
discarded.
We show in Chapter 5 how an attacker can violate security requirement (1) and in
Chapter 6 how processing monitoring can enforce requirement (2) and thus circumvent the
problems caused by attack traffic.
4.3.2 Attacker Capabilities
The capabilities of an attacker that define the potential attack space include the fol-
lowing: (1) An attacker can send arbitrary data and control packets; (2) An attacker can
modify instruction and data memory through exploits; (3) An attacker cannot modify the
source code or binary of the protocol implementation before it is installed on the router;
(4) An attacker cannot physically access the router. These capabilities reflect what most
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practical attackers can do: they can try to hack a router remotely (i.e., (1) and (2)), but the
basic functionality of the router is benign (i.e., (3) and (4)).
Based on this security model, we present a concrete attack [9].
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CHAPTER 5
NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURE ATTACK
The main idea of the attack is illustrated in Figure 5.1. A cleverly crafted packet may
be able to exploit software vulnerabilities (e.g., stack smashing attack) and change the
operation of the packet processor. A simple change in the software could lead to an infinite
loop where the same packet is transmitted repeatedly. Such an approach is particularly
effective and damaging since the attack originates from within the network, where the
compromised system may have access to links with tens of Gigabits per second bandwidth.
To describe the attack in detail, we briefly discuss the code vulnerability that we ex-
ploit, as specific example code that exploits this vulnerability in the context of protocol
processing, and an example data packet that triggers an exploit of the vulnerability.
5.1 Vulnerability
Our attack exploits a vulnerability in the program that is executed on the packet proces-
sor of the routers. There are known C/C++ code exploits such as pointer subterfuge, use of
strcpy and memcpy for buffer overflows, and integer vulnerabilities. A large number of
them is present in commercial software designs and implementations. These vulnerabili-
ties, under certain conditions, can be exploited by attackers, especially if programmers are
not writing security-aware code.
The premise of our attack is that the packet processing code is benign and does not
contain intentionally malicious code. The attacker sends a carefully crafted packet to one
of the router’s network interface cards. The processing of this packet turns the ‘good’
code/protocol routine that runs on the network processor into ‘bad’ code. There is nothing
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 Figure 5.1. Example of in-network attack. Vulnerable packet processing systems on
routers can be used to launch large-scale denial-of-service attacks with a single packet.
inherently wrong with the packet or the application code, but the combination of the two
can lead to the processor’s malfunctioning. In our case, the incoming packet changes the
control flow of the routing and redirects it to malicious code that resides inside the payload
of the attack packet. For all other packets, the correct processing is performed by the router.
The specific exploit we use in our attack is an integer vulnerability. Certain integer
arithmetic operations, depending on the conditions, can result to unexpected outcome. Sign
errors, truncation errors, integer overflows or underflows can occur, which, if not taken into
account before the program execution, can lead to programs with unexpected behavior and
security flaws [46].
Our attack is based on a vulnerability caused by an integer overflow. As we know,
integers can represent values within a given range. For example, the integer type ‘unsigned
short’ ranges from 0 to 65535. When a variable declared as short integer exceeds the upper
limit, the assigned value wraps around zero in order to stay within the allowed limits. If the
programmer does not anticipate this behavior, and the remaining of the program reuses that
value at some point, potentially harmful things can happen. The following example code
contains an integer overflow vulnerability:
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unsigned short sum;
unsigned short one = 65532;
unsigned short two = 8;
sum = one + two;
The value assigned to the variable sum is not 65540, as one would expect, but 4 due to
the limited amount of memory space that is assigned to it.
5.1.1 Vulnerable Protocol Processing Code
Routers perform a variety of protocol processing operations, ranging from simple IP
forwarding to more advanced functions that include IPsec termination, intrusion detection,
tunneling, etc. For our attack example, we assume that the protocol processing operation
consists of adding a header to a packet. We are describing this operation in the context of
the congestion management protocol described in [4] to be concrete, but it is important to
note that the vulnerability can apply to a much broader range of protocol operations that
add packet headers.
The congestion management (CM) protocol uses a custom protocol header that is in-
serted between the IP header and the UDP header. This process is illustrated in Figure 5.2.
For the discussion of our attack, the detailed operation of the CM protocol and its header
format is irrelevant. The important aspect is that CM adds a header in a packet.
The processing steps associated with the header insertion by the CM protocol are:
1. Parse headers to identify header boundary between IP and UDP.
2. Shift the UDP header (and higher layer headers and payload) to the right to make
room for the CM header.
3. Insert CM header in packet.
Figure 5.3 shows pseudocode for the part of the program that inserts the new CM
header in the original packet, which is the part of the code that contains a vulnerability.
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Figure 5.2. Protocol Header Insertion.
While writing the CM header generation part of the protocol, a security aware program-
mer would perform a check on the packet’s total size before shifting the UDP datagram
and inserting the new header into the original packet. This check is making sure that the
outgoing packet – after the 12-byte CM header is appended to it – does not exceed the maxi-
mum datagram size. Only if the check (CM hdr size + UDP length) < MAX PKT
passes, the original UDP datagram gets shifted by 12 bytes, and the CM header followed
by the original UDP datagram are copied into the new packet buffer. The following line is
the one that performs the shift and copy operation: memcpy((new pkt buf+len1),
original pkt, len2); where len1 is the CM header size (12 bytes) and len2 is
the UDP datagram’s total length. Since the total length field of the UDP header is a 16-
bit field and the CM header is only 12 bytes long, the programmer could choose to assign
len1 and len2 to ‘unsigned short’ integer types, so that the embedded processor’s limited
resources are not wasted.
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#define MAX_PKT 1484
int generate_CM_header(int orig_pkt[], unsigned 
short len1, unsigned short len2)
{
        int new_pkt_buf[MAX_PKT];
        unsigned short sum;
        sum= len1+ len2;
        if(sum > MAX_PKT) { return -1;} 
        else {
        memcpy((new_pkt_buf+len1), orig_pkt, len2);
        ...
        return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
        int orig_pkt[];
        ... 
        generate_CM_header(orig_pkt, CM_hdr_size, 
UDP_length);
        ...
}
Figure 5.3. Example Application Code.
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This code, while correct for CM protocol processing, contains a vulnerability that is
based on an integer overflow in the length check. A carefully crafted attack packet can
exploit this vulnerability.
5.1.2 Attack Packet
The vulnerability does not exhibit problematic behavior for most “normal” packets that
are short enough to accommodate the 12-byte CM header within the maximum IP packet
length. An attacker, on the other hand, can send a long UDP packet that triggers an over-
flow. If an attacker chooses to send a regular, oversized packet (larger than MAX PKT), the
size check will fail. However, if an attacker sends a packet with a malformed UDP length
field (for example with the 16-bit value 0xfffc (65532 in decimal)), then the code performs
incorrectly:
1. CM hdr size + UDP length = 12 + 65532 = 8 (incorrect due to integer
overflow)
2. CM hdr size + UDP length < MAX PKT (even though it is not)
3. 65532 bytes are copied into the new pkt buf, which can only accommodate 1484
bytes
Due to the malformed UDP total length field of the incoming packet, the processing
of the protocol code leads to unexpected program behavior. A large amount of data ends
up being copied into a buffer that was not designed to handle more than the maximum
datagram size. The result is the notorious buffer overflow attack, which will overwrite the
processor’s stack.
Figure 5.4 shows the stack of the processor when the function generate CM header
is running. We can see the original incoming packet residing in the bottom of the stack,
as part of the main function. The last few bytes of the original packet correspond to the
payload and contain the attack code, which the attacker has devised. Once the function
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generate CM header starts processing the incoming packet with the malformed UDP
length field, the new packet buffer will overflow and start rewriting the local variables of
the current frame, continue with the stack pointer and finally overwrite the return address of
the current frame as well. Originally, the program should have jumped back to the calling
function after finishing with the CM header generation, but when the return address is over-
written, the program will jump to whichever address the attacker has chosen! Of course,
the attacker chooses to overwrite the return address with the stack memory address where
the attack code begins. Thereby, the attacker can make the program jump to malicious code
that is carried inside the packet payload.
In our attack, we insert a few instructions of assembly code into the payload, which
repeatedly broadcast the same attack packet in an infinite loop. As we show in Section 5.2,
a single attack packet of this type triggers a denial-of-service attack that jams the routers
outgoing link at full data rate. While our attack is used for launching a denial-of-service
service attack, it should be noted that an attacker could choose to run attack code with other
purposes.
With this example, we demonstrate that vulnerabilities in software-based routers are
not only hypothetical, but can occur in common protocol processing code. We also show
that these vulnerabilities can be exploited to execute arbitrary attack code.
5.2 Attack Demonstration
To demonstrate the feasibility and effects of the attack described in this chapter, we
show a prototype implementation in a real network. We have implemented the attack on the
Click modular router which runs on a Linux system [23] and on a custom packet processor
[57] based on the NetFPGA platform [26]. The custom packet processor uses a Plasma soft
core [42], which is a 32-bit MIPS architecture processor.
Our experimental setup is shown in Figure 5.5. We send video traffic from one end-
system to the other over a network consisting of two routers. The first router implements
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Figure 5.5. Experimental Setup.
the CM header insertion processing described above. The second router removes the CM
header. The header insertion routine on the first router is implemented as discussed in
Section 5.1.1 and exhibits the integer overflow vulnerability.
We measured the incoming and outgoing traffic on the first router for different scenar-
ios. Figure 5.6 shows the results for benign traffic and attack traffic. There is a 30-second
video transmission as baseline traffic (shown in green). In the first scenario, only the benign
traffic is sent and the router forwards it as expected. In the second scenario, a single attack
packet is injected into the incoming traffic. Since the attack packet triggers an infinite loop
of retransmitting itself, all output traffic consists of attack traffic (shown in red). There are
two important observations: (1) No benign traffic is forwarded. Thus, the attack not only
absorbs all unused bandwidth, but all bandwidth. (2) The amount of outgoing attack traffic
is around 850 Mbps, which is close to the total link rate of the system. The performance of
the system is limited to 850 Mbps due to the maximum clock frequency in our prototype.
In a commercial high-performance router, attack traffic would be sent at the full link rate.
These results very clearly show that the attack we describe in this dissertation is indeed
possible in practice and that it has devastating effects on the network by generating attack
traffic at full link rates in the core of the network.
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(a) Benign network traffic
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 (b) Benign traffic and single attack packet
Figure 5.6. Traffic Rates at Input Port and Output Port of Vulnerable Router. Benign video
traffic is shown in green, attack traffic is shown in red.
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CHAPTER 6
DEFENSE MECHANISMS
To defend against this type of attack on the packet processing systems of routers, a
variety of security mechanisms could be used. These can range from using No eXecute
(NX) bits to mark non-instruction memory to other security techniques used in embedded
systems [37]. In this chapter, we propose a secure packet processor design [8]. We describe
its operation and demonstrate that it can defend against the attack we describe.
6.1 Secure Packet Processing
The key concepts behind the design of a secure packet processing system are discussed
in this section. More details on the implementation of the security features are covered in
Section 6.2.
6.1.1 Security Model
To provide a basis for the discussion of security in our system, we state the security
requirements and attacker capabilities explicitly. For security requirements, we assume
that
 An attacker should not be able to make a router perform any action that deviates from
normal forwarding behavior.
 Intrusion attempts through the data path of the router should lead to a drop of the
offending packet.
 If an intrusion attempt has changed the internal state of the router, a recovery mech-
anism should reset the system to a secure state.
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 Intrusion attempts should not lead to denial-of-service due to recovery overhead.
In the context of these security requirements, we assume that a malicious entity is able
to perform the following actions:
 Send packets (control or data) to the packet processor, possibly triggering abnormal
behavior.
 Gain remote access to the system and change the data memory, the instruction mem-
ory of the processor, log files, or extract and modify secret keys.
 Launch Denial-of-service attacks by sending massive traffic or by directly disabling
links.
 Use reprogramming interfaces to control the entire router.
However, an attacker does not have physical access to the router and cannot access
the binary file of the application currently executed on the packet processor, because it
resides outside the platform. Once it is launched on the instruction memory of the hardware
platform though, memory modification is considered a potential attack scenario.
The attacks mentioned in this section is not a comprehensive enumeration of all likely
scenarios. We just outlined the general context of the possible ways in which a misbehaving
user can attack a packet processing system. We tried to be as general as possible in our
assumptions, and include most of current and next generation network vulnerabilities.
6.1.2 Attack Detection through Monitoring
The main idea behind our secure packet processor is to integrate monitoring function-
ality into the hardware of the packet processing system. When an attacker attempts to hack
into the software-programmable processor cores of the system, they may succeed in chang-
ing the processing behavior of the system. However, the monitoring systems in the packet
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Figure 6.1. Security Monitoring on the Packet Processor.
processor can detect this change and trigger a response (i.e., packet drop and system recov-
ery). Since our monitoring components are embedded in the system hardware, it is difficult
for a hacker to attack both the processor and the (hard to access) monitors at the same time.
Thus, this approach by design provides more security than a conventional general-purpose
processing system.
There are several important challenges that need to be met when using hardware moni-
tors in a processing system:
 Correct detection: The monitoring system needs to be able to correctly identify intru-
sion attacks. Our system achieves this by checking for any deviation from the known
correct operation of the packet processor.
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 Fast detection: When intrusion occurs, it is important to detect it quickly to reduce its
potential impact. Our system can detect (and recover from) deviations in processing
operations within only four processing cycles.
 Low overhead: The resource requirements for a monitor should be small to limit the
impact of monitoring on system cost. Our monitoring system only requires single-
digit percent additional hardware resources compared to a conventional packet pro-
cessor implementation.
Before discussing the detailed operation of the monitoring system, we describe the
high-level system architecture.
6.1.3 System Overview
The main design goal of our system is to provide security techniques to defend against
potential attacks on a software-programmable packet processing system. Our system builds
on the four-core prototype of a packet processor as described in Chapter 3.4 [57].
Figure 6.1 presents a system (high) level view of the software-programmable packet
processor that uses security modules to ensure the correct functionality of a modern router.
As discussed in [57] next generation routers are expected to have multiple packet process-
ing units, in order achieve fast and balanced processing of packets that belong to different
flows. A flow classification unit assigns packets to specific flows, and an output arbiter
module sends the processed packets to the corresponding outputs.
Each packet processing unit will be possibly executing a different program in order to
process the packets that are distributed to it. If we assume that an attacker is able to access
and modify the instruction memory of each individual PPU (processing attack), the whole
router will be compromised. To prevent that from happening, we can have an instruction-
level security monitor attached to each PPU, which checks each and every instruction exe-
cuted on the processor core in real time and determines if it is valid or not. We will explain
the way this check is performed in the next section.
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Moreover, due to vulnerabilities in the data path, we would expect the packet proces-
sor to be attacked at the protocol level as well. We can imagine a situation where valid
processing instructions are executed on the PPUs, but still the overall router behavior is
abnormal. For example, if the IP-forwarding routine is running on one of the cores, a
Denial-of-Service attack could flood the system by requesting a large amount of duplicate
packets to be forwarded to the output interfaces. To counter such kinds of attacks, we could
use an I/O monitor attached to the I/O interface of the packet processor, which checks cer-
tain characteristics of incoming and outgoing packets: payload checksum, packet count,
tags or time-stamps in the header of the packets etc.
6.1.4 Monitoring Functionality
Both monitoring systems function independently from the packet processor. They use
separate hardware resources, making sure that an attack targeting the processor will not
affect the security monitors’ operation. Moreover, they use up as few resources as possible,
while keeping the monitoring speed synchronized with the packet processor’s speed.
The main idea behind the instruction-level monitor is illustrated in Figure 6.2.
 Prior to installing a specific protocol processing routine on the packet processor, we
analyze the binary file of the application by breaking it down to basic blocks of
instructions and determining all the possible execution paths.
 The derived information is stored in a ‘basic block’ data structure on the hardware
platform.
 The processor, during runtime, keeps updating the security monitor with the moni-
toring stream.
 If the processor’s current execution path deviates from the correct one - as instructed
by the basic block data structure - the security monitor detects an error.
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Figure 6.2. Monitoring System Overview.
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In case of error detection, the monitoring system assumes that the instruction store must
have been modified, and it takes the recovery route. It interrupts the packet processor’s
operation on the specific packet, reloads the protocol processing code on the processor
from a storage place that is assumed to be secure and not accessible by the attacker.
To enhance the instruction-level monitor functionality, an I/O monitor [56] can be used
to track the I/O behavior of the packet processing system. This is a higher level monitor
that records protocol specific characteristics. It is not connected to the packet processor,
but to the input and output interfaces. The I/O monitor correlates the stream of incoming
packets to the stream of outgoing packets to detect cases where the router is not operating as
expected. The abnormality here is detected from a network protocol perspective, whereas
the router’s function can look legitimate from a processing point of view (e.g. correctly
executed instructions during a DoS attack).
There are several types of information that can be collected by just observing the incom-
ing and outgoing packets. The most intuitive thing to document is the number of incoming
and outgoing packets, and check for imbalance. Of course, if the flow of packets increases
in the output interface, this does not always indicate an attack condition. The I/O moni-
tor should be able to account for protocols that allow for multicast or broadcast services.
Moreover, the checksum of the packet’s payload can be computed to identify unauthorized
alterations. By placing tags or time-stamps in the headers of the incoming packets, the I/O
monitor will be able to detect whether a specific incoming packet is directed to the output
interface with significant delay. Such an event signals abnormal degradation of processing
performance.
6.2 Prototype Implementation
In this section, we provide in detail the design and proof-of-concept implementation of
a packet processing system that uses the two security techniques we have described above.
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Our prototype is implemented on a NetFPGA [26]. Our design is scalable and can be ported
on other FPGA platforms or ASICs.
6.2.1 Instruction-level Monitor
For this prototype, to be consistent with the NetFPGA design and the packet processor
speed, we used 64-bit data path and designed all the units to operate at 62.5MHz. The
security monitor runs in parallel to the packet processing unit, and is designed to use four
pipeline stages.
The first task is to decide what the monitoring stream, which the PPU continuously
sends to the security monitor, should be. According to our assumptions, an attacker can
abuse the packet processor’s operation, either by modifying the current protocol routine to
execute malicious code, or by adding some piece of code that performs malicious oper-
ations. We can monitor such malicious behavior by making the packet processor stream
information regarding the current execution path in realtime. There is a variety of options
to choose from:
 Opcode: By sending to the monitor opcode information, we monitor the operations
performed on the processor, which indicate the functionality of the executed applica-
tion. For an attack to become possible, the attacker will have to replace the instruction
set, with another malicious set of instructions that use the same opcodes in the exact
same sequence.
 Instruction address: Since the memory address used to store the instruction set is
unique, the attacker would have to write malicious code that stores the new instruc-
tions in the same location in the instruction memory as the original application does.
This would also require the malicious code to branch at the same exact points with
the legitimate code.
 Instruction address+Instruction word: This kind of streaming pattern combines two
pieces of information, and makes it harder for an attacker to come up with attack code
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that goes undetected. We could also add the opcode, or control flow information to
the monitoring stream, but this will cause a significance increase in the system’s
resource consumption.
 Hash of any of the above: The processor is streaming a compact hashed value of any
of the above combinations. The more bits we use to compute the hash, the stronger
the monitoring pattern is. However, the number of used bits will affect the memory
utilization. After all, it is a trade off between available memory on the hardware
platform and the strength of security features.
Depending on the information we choose to stream, the software analysis and the con-
tents of the basic block data structure shown in Figure 6.2 have to be adapted accordingly.
For our prototype, the instruction address information was used. Before we load a specific
protocol processing routine on one of the processor cores, we analyze the application bi-
nary file off-line and break it down to a number of basic blocks. We place instructions that
are executed the one after the other in the same basic block, which ends with a conditional
or unconditional jump instruction. We use a block RAM memory on the FPGA to store
information about the program’s execution path. This memory (data structure) is indexed
by the instruction address sequence of the application and contains two blocks for each
entry. The first one is the basic block each instruction memory address belongs to, and the
second is the potential next hop address the instruction could jump to. This BRAM is used
as a guide to the correct processor core operation.
The implementation level details of the instruction level monitor are shown in Fig-
ure 6.3. Each pipeline stage takes once clock cycle to complete.
In the first pipeline stage, we extract the address of the currently executed instruction
on the packet processing unit. We use this address to index the BRAM, which takes one
cycle to output the basic block in which this instruction resided, and the next hop address
(in case of a jump instruction), if there is one.
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Figure 6.3. Instruction Level Monitor Design.
In the second stage, we propagate the current basic block and next hop information we
get from the BRAM, and give those values as input to the third stage. At the same time, we
record the current basic block information into a FIFO module. This FIFO is used to keep
track of the execution path, by storing the previously and currently executed basic block
numbers. This module has minimal memory requirements, because it only contains two
values at a time. When we read from it, the head of the FIFO outputs the previous basic
block, and when we write in it, we record the current basic block, which we read in the
next clock cycle and so on.
The third and fourth stages are the most important, since they implement our monitoring
algorithm:
 Check if the current basic block number matches the basic block of the previous
instruction.
 If it does, it means it is a valid instruction – continue to the next one.
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 If not, check if this instruction is within the next basic block.
 In case it is, this is a valid basic block jump – continue with the next instruction.
 If not, go to the fourth stage and use the next hop address information to index the
BRAM. Verify that the currently executed instruction is a valid jump instruction.
 If it is, it denotes correct operation – continue.
 Otherwise, signal that the packet should be dropped.
In the final stage, the monitor sends the packet drop signal to the packet memory unit,
which stops the processing of the current packet. The corresponding packet buffer drops
this packet and is ready to receive a new one. At the same time the instruction memory
is reset, so that the harmful code is overwritten and does not affect the next packet to be
processed by the packet processor. While resetting the instruction memory, we first switch
to a backup piece of memory (which resides safely inside the hardware platform) and then
start reloading the memory initialization file back to the infected instruction memory of the
processor. In this way, in case another attack happens during the processing of the next
packets, we can immediately switch back to the corrected instruction memory.
6.2.2 I/O Monitor
The I/O monitor design in our prototype is very simple and is shown in Figure 6.4.
The purpose of this implementation is to illustrate just one example of how a high-level
(protocol related) monitor should function, and show that it is possible to implement this
feature on our packet processing system with no additional overhead, and without having to
compromise on the throughput of the processor. We use resources (logic) that are already
present on the reference NetFPGA router, to design two counters, one attached to the input
queue interface keeping track of the incoming packets, and the other one connected to the
output queues, counting the outgoing packets (within a specific window).
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Figure 6.4. I/O Monitor Design.
Thanks to the flow classification module implemented on our router, we can easily
extend the packet count functionality of the I/Omonitor, and make the monitoring operation
protocol-aware. It is possible to check the header of every packet to determine which
protocol is currently running on each processor core. Based on this information, we can
make the I/O monitor treat traffic in a protocol specific way. For example, if it is determined
that a unicast protocol is executed (http, ftp etc.) the I/Omonitor would expect the incoming
packet count to be equal or greater than the outgoing packet count. In the case that the
protocol allows for multicast capability, an increase in the outgoing packet count should be
considered legitimate protocol behavior (one incoming packet corresponds to N outgoing).
In either scenario, once unusual operation is observed, the packet memory should be flushed
and the packet processor reset.
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6.3 Evaluation
In this section, we demonstrate the correct functionality of the implemented security
features, by crafting an attack example. We also discuss resource utilization and perfor-
mance results. For the system’s performance, we use the delay in detecting abnormal in-
structions and the system’s throughput as metrics.
6.3.1 Triggering Invalid Behavior
In this scenario, we first load a unicast IP-forwarding routine on the packet processor.
For our prototype, we have chosen to store instruction addresses for monitoring purposes.
Alternatively, as mentioned in Section 6.2.1, we could have implemented a security monitor
that contains the hash value of the instruction address and the corresponding instruction
word. Such a monitoring pattern uses less memory resources and makes it even harder for
the attacker to come up with attack code [28].
Let’s assume that our application code at some point executes a branch instruction, with
two possible basic blocks where the program can jump to. The corresponding disassem-
bled application code is shown in Figure 6.5. As we can see, the potential jump targets
are memory addresses 0x0218 or 0x01e4. The former contains valid code, whereas the
latter corresponds to attack code. On the other hand, inside the security monitor we store
instruction addresses only for the valid basic blocks.
Since we do not inform the security monitor that the program can possibly branch to
memory address 0x01e4, the monitor will consider a jump to this particular address as an
attack. So, in order to trigger an attack, we can send to the processor packets that cause our
program to take this specific execution path (address 0x01e4). This path is unknown to the
instruction level monitor, thus, the monitor treats the received packets as attack packets.
6.3.2 Security Monitor Operation
In Figure 6.7, we show how the whole system (packet processor and security monitor)
operates under the attack scenario. The horizontal axis denotes the clock cycle at which
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Figure 6.5. Attack scenario.
Figure 6.6. Simulation Results.
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each operation takes place. In our experiment, we send 4 small packets (around 60 bytes
long) into the router. The first is an ‘attack’ packet and the remaining 3 are valid packets.
We should note here that under normal operation the total time the packet processor takes
to forward a small packet is around 600 clock cycles [57].
The packet processing system functions as follows: The four packets come back to
back into the packet processor’s packet buffers. At some point, while the first packet is
getting processed, the program jumps to the memory address 0x01e4, which is unknown to
the monitor and triggers an attack response. The monitor starts performing the operations
we described at Figure 6.3 in four pipelined stages, and 5 cycles later packet 1 is dropped.
At this point our instruction-level monitor stalls the processing of the current packet, drops
the packet, and in the same clock cycle the instruction memory is reset. The recovery
phase of the system takes approximately 6 cycles. After those few cycles, the processing
resumes and the remaining three packets are forwarded normally. Because of the 6 cycles,
in which the system stays idle (recovery phase), the total processing time of packets 2,3
and 4 increases from 600 to 606 cycles.
In Figure 6.6 we can observe the same sequence of events in our simulator tool (Mod-
elsim). Signal in packet count counts the incoming packets, out packet count the out-
going, and ‘drop packet’ is the signal that notifies the processor to drop the current packet.
Packet 1 gets dropped when the signal pp mem address is equal to 0x01e4, which is
the initial instruction address of the ‘attack’ block of instructions. By setting the signal
ppu=lr=rst, we rewrite the instruction memory of the IP-forwarding application. Due to
space constraints, we only show packet 2 coming out of the output queue.
Parallel to the instruction level monitor, our I/O monitor counts incoming and outgo-
ing packets. It reports 4 incoming packets and 3 outgoing. Since we experimented on
the unicast IP-forwarding routine, our I/O monitor considers the protocol level behavior
legitimate. As expected, it does not detect the instruction level attack.
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Figure 6.7. Security Monitor Operation.
A theoretical scenario where we would have the opposite outcome (the I/O monitor
detecting an attack while the instruction level monitor does not detect the attack) would be
if for the same unicast IP-forwarding protocol, we duplicate some packets and send them
to all ports jamming them. Then the I/O monitor would count more outgoing packets than
incoming, which is not usual behavior for a unicast protocol. On the other hand, there is
no reason for the instruction level monitor to detect an attack, since the processing routine
(forwarding) is executed correctly for all packets.
6.3.3 Performance Results
As mentioned in the previous section, once an attack is detected, the recovery phase
of the instruction level monitor lasts only a few cycles. This time is necessary for the
instruction set to be correctly reloaded on the NetFPGA. Compared to the number of cycles
it takes for the processor to forward even a small packet (around 600 cycles), the time our
system stays idle before resuming correct processing functionality is not significant. This
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Table 6.1. Resource consumption and performance of single core system.
Single core Single core w/ main monitor Single core w/ 2 monitors
Slice LUTs 15,025 15,112 15,134
BRAM (RAMB16s) 124 130 130
throughput(Mbps) 67.2 64.1 63.9
is an important feature because, otherwise, an attacker could just keep on sending packets
that cause the system to misbehave, so that the processor is locked into a repeated effort of
long recoveries, without doing any useful processing at the same time. That would become
a vulnerability of our recovery mechanism that leads by itself to DoS attacks.
Here, we performed an experiment to measure the throughput of 1) our single core
packet processing system and 2) our four-core packet processing system when the security
monitors are on. Using three of the Ethernet ports on the NetFPGA system, we connect
the network processor to three workstation computers for traffic generation and trace col-
lection. The routing and processing steps for flows on the network processor are set up
statically for each experiment. First, we experiment by sending valid packets only, and then
by sending a combination of valid and invalid packets. We did not notice major changes in
the processor’s throughput in neither the single nor the four-core secure packet processing
systems. We can still achieve high data rates (maximum of 100Mbps). In Table 6.1, we
report the average throughput numbers for the single core processor and in Table 6.2 the
corresponding results for the four-core processor with and without the security monitors.
The important thing to note is that the throughput of the processors with embedded security
monitors is almost the same with the throughput that the cores achieves by themselves. The
data rates are in the order of 100Mbps because the experiment was performed by forward-
ing small packets. In the case of large packets the packet processor can achieve throughput
greater than 2Gbps [57].
As for the resource consumption of our monitoring systems, the packet processing sys-
tem with both security monitors uses 0.8% more slice LUTs compared to the single core
processor alone. Memory-wise we observe an increase of 4.8% in the consumption of
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Table 6.2. Resource consumption and performance of four-core system.
4-core 4-core w/ main monitor 4-core w/ 2 monitors
Slice LUTs 22,469 22,847 22,872
BRAM (RAMB16s) 158 164 164
throughput(Mbps) 74.6 72.1 72
block RAMs. For the four-core system we observe that the logic utilization increases by
1.8% while memory consumption goes up by 3.8%
6.4 Defenses in Multi-core Packet Processing Systems
Packet processors have multiple simple embedded processor cores that can be pro-
grammed to handle network traffic. The hardware monitoring technique that has been
proposed so far can protect each of the individual cores from potential attacks. In this
section we present efforts in further improving the protection mechanisms for packet pro-
cessors.
In previous sections, we have been using the NetFPGA platform for our designs, which
is a reconfigurable hardware platform optimized for high-speed networking. It is based
on the Xilinx Virtex-II Pro 50 FPGA, which has limited available logic, and can barely
fit a 4-core packet processor. Since the Reconfigurable Computing Group of our depart-
ment managed to port the NetFPGA reference router design to the Altera DE4 development
board, we used the same board for our 4-core secure packet processing design. This board
has approximately 10 times more logic than the Virtex-II Pro FPGA board and our prelim-
inary calculations show that it can even be sufficient for a 16-core design. The objective
of this implementation is to explore alternative monitoring implementations and evaluate
the throughput performance and the scalability of a multi-core network processor with in-
tegrated security features. The following work was conducted in collaboration with Harikr-
ishnan Chandrikakutty, Deepak Unnikrishnan, Russell Tessier and TilmanWolf. Harikrish-
nan was in charge of the hardware implementation of the new monitoring idea and Deepak
assisted in the experimentation part of the project.
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6.4.1 Programmable-logic-based Monitoring
As we have shown in [9], vulnerable packet processing code can be exploited to launch
a in-network denial-of-service attack, and, as a response to that, hardware monitoring tech-
niques can be effectively used to reduce the vulnerability of packet processors in routers.
In the networking domain, low overhead and fast detection speed are particularly impor-
tant. Therefore, we need to think of ways to further improve the protection mechanisms for
network processors.
One key aspect of processing monitors is that they should dynamically adapt to the
processing operations that are implemented on the processor that is monitored. That means
that the monitoring functionality may need to adapt during runtime as the workload of
the system changes. In networks, there can be considerable variation in the processing
workload due to changing network traffic [58] and thus the ability for adaptation in the
monitoring subsystem is a necessary system requirement. In addition, network processors
are based on multi-core architectures where traffic is processed by many parallel cores.
Since many of these cores perform the same type of processing, it is possible to share some
of the monitors among cores.
Our previous monitoring technique [8] has generally assumed a separate monitoring
structure implemented in fixed hardware for each network processor core. Monitor func-
tionality is programmed via an embedded memory within the monitor and in its preliminary
form the system does not take advantage of monitor sharing between cores. However, for
network processors which do not need monitoring, the dedicated monitoring hardware is
left unused, wasting hardware resources. These observations suggest that programmable
logic is an ideal platform for implementing processing monitors since it allows for high-
performance implementation, reprogramming, and workload adaptation. Also, if the logic
is not used for monitoring, it could potentially be used for different functions, such as
network statistics gathering.
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Figure 6.8. System overview for multi-core secure packet processing system with recon-
figurable monitors
6.4.2 System Details
In this section, we briefly describe an FPGA-based monitoring system for multi-core
network processors. The static instruction sequence used by a processor core is converted
into a state machine that is implemented in FPGA logic. These monitors require minimal
resource usage, can be configured on a per-application basis, and can be shared across
multiple network processor cores performing the same packet processing operations.
A high-level overview of the implemented multi-core network processor system includ-
ing monitors is shown in Figure 6.8. In this setup, four soft processor cores used for packet
processing are implemented in a Stratix IV GX230 located on an Altera DE4 board. The
router infrastructure surrounding the cores and the monitoring hardware are taken from
the NetFPGA reference router [1] which has been migrated to the Stratix IV family. The
DE4 board consists of four 1 Gbps Ethernet interfaces, a PCI Express interface, up to 8
GB of DDR RAM and 2 MB of SRAM. The hardware data path of the modified router is
implemented as a pipeline of customizable modules.
57
In this implementation, each security monitor operates as an entity that is isolated from
the processor cores. The FPGA logic and memory associated with the security monitors
is not visible to the processor cores and an attack on a processor core will not impact the
operation of its associated monitor. Our per-instruction monitoring approach requires an
analysis of the program instruction flow immediately following compilation. As part of
this analysis, both conditional and non-conditional instructions are examined. For non-
conditional statements, instructions are assumed to execute from instruction memory in se-
quence. For branches, it is expected that either the following instruction in memory or the
branch target is followed. A compact state machine is then constructed from this instruction
analysis such that each instruction represents a state. During execution, the state machine
progresses through states as instructions are executed. If the run-time execution instruction
sequence deviates from the expected sequence for either branches or non-branches, a se-
curity error is detected and a reset signal is sent to the processor. This reset signal causes
the current packet to be dropped, the processor registers to be reset, and processing is then
restarted with the next assigned packet.
6.4.3 Comparison to Fixed Hardware Monitor
The previous implementation of a network processor security monitor [8] was designed
for network processors which do not include reconfigurable hardware or monitor sharing.
This monitor does not allow for any changes to the monitor logic functionality. The new
programmable logic-based monitor idea has the following advantages:
1. The amount of information stored in block memory for the programmable logic is
limited to small (e.g. four-bit) instruction hash values. This greatly reduces memory
consumption versus the storage of branch target addresses and basic block numbers.
2. Jump logic for the programmable logic approach is fashioned from programmable
logic rather than requiring extra block memory storage and a second block memory
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lookup. This feature reduces the pipeline length of the new approach, allowing for a
faster identification of an instruction flow error.
3. The programmable logic allows for customized connections between processor cores
and needed monitors. Monitor sharing is easily accomplished by pipelining. For
fixed architecture monitors, one monitor is dedicated per processor core, whether it
is needed or not.
6.4.4 Experimental Results
The four-core network processor including shared monitors was successfully imple-
mented on an Altera DE4 platform. The four-core system under monitoring was first eval-
uated for standard IPv4 packet forwarding for a series of packet sizes. A single 1 Gbps
MAC port was used for packet receive and a separate port was used for transmit. For this
experiment, no malicious packets were sent. A single monitor was shared by all four cores.
As shown in Figure 6.9, the throughput of the four-core network processor improves as the
packet size increases, an expected result. The experiment was also performed in hardware
without the use of monitors. The results indicate that in the absence of malicious packets,
the throughput graph is the same for both monitored and un-monitored packet flows. This
result is not surprising since per-packet processing requires hundreds of cycles while mon-
itoring, which occurs in parallel to processing, can achieve a throughput of one cycle per
instruction.
A comparison of the previous fixed-hardware monitor architecture [8] and the new
programmable-logic based approach in reconfigurable hardware appears in Table 6.3. To-
tal instructions and control flow instructions (branches) are enumerated along with the
resources required to build the monitors. Monitors for both standard packet forwarding
(IPv4) and the CM approach are included. Programmable-logic monitors for four-core im-
plementations were shared while individual fixed logic monitors were needed for four-core
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Table 6.3. Resource utilization of network processor benchmarks
Instructions Fixed Hardware Programmable Logic
Benchmark Total Control Flow ALUTs Regs Mem.Bits ALUTs Regs Mem.Bits
IPv4 (1-core) 327 17 40 34 6272 313 159 2048
CM (1-core) 289 21 40 34 6272 329 167 2048
IPv4 (4-core) 327 17 160 136 25088 863 486 2048
CM (4-core) 289 21 160 136 25088 974 529 2048
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 (b) Benign traffic and single attack packet
Figure 6.10. Traffic Rates at Input Port and Output Port of Router with ProcessingMonitor.
implementations. It is evident that the new approach saves considerable block memory
resources in addition to allowing for resource sharing between the monitors.
6.5 Demonstration of Real Attack Detection
Lets see now how our system responds under a real attack scenario, like the one de-
scribed in Section 5. We have experimented on the same custom processor used for the
setup shown in Figure 5.5. The prototype successfully detects the example attack (and any
other attack that changes the control flow), halts the processor, drops the packet, and re-
stores the system within 6 instruction cycles. This very small time for recovery allows our
secure packet processor to operate at full data rate even when under attack. The overhead
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for adding a monitoring system to the packet processor is very small (0.8% increase on
slice LUTs and 5.6% on memory elements).
Figure 6.10 shows the operation of the secure packet processor under attack. As can
be seen, not only does the processor not fall victim to the attack, but it also continues to
forward regular traffic without interruption.
While the results from our secure packet processor are encouraging by demonstrating
that there are defenses against the types of attacks that we describe in this dissertation, it
is important to note that such defenses are not currently deployed in the Internet. Existing
software-based routers are still vulnerable and more research and development is necessary
to design and deploy defenses against this novel type of attack.
6.6 Inferring Packet Processing Behavior using I/O monitors
We have so far assumed that packet processing is a monolithic processing operation.
This assumption, however, does not always apply in practice. Due to the complexity of
different packet processing tasks implemented on a router, modularity in processing is a
necessity. Several approaches to modularity in packet processing have been proposed [23].
Some functions performed by different elements could be random early detection, flow
classification, IP look-up, queuing or even drop-packet. In this section, we describe an idea
that can support security in such a modular router.
The monitoring approach we have developed previously lends itself well for modular
implementations as we show below. Nevertheless, the use of independent monitors for
different processing modules poses a new type of security challenge: How can the correct
overall operation of a router across modules be ensured? In particular, an attacker may
change the operation of a router such that individual module monitors cannot detect an
attack. Therefore, it is necessary to have a comprehensive defense mechanism that can
protect modular router implementations from data path attacks.
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6.6.1 Verification in the Data Path
Here, we present a modular technique for validation of a router’s correct operation by
monitoring the “processing” of each module, examining input/output flow characteristics
and correlating them with the processing time spent on individual modules [13].
6.6.1.1 Protection Mechanisms
In previous sections we have demonstrated the feasibility and effects of data plane at-
tacks in a real network setting. One way to counter this type of attacks is to use processing
monitors which track the operations on the network processor, as described in [8]. The
monitor can determine if attacks occur because the processor’s operations deviate from the
operations that are valid - as determined by offline analysis of the processing binary. In that
work, we effectively monitor the program execution as a whole.
However, due to vulnerabilities in the data path, we can expect attacks at the protocol
level as well. We can have a situation where valid processing instructions are executed on
the network processor, but still the overall router behavior is abnormal. For example, in the
case of intentionally misleading routing information advertisement in RIP, a large amount
of multi-cast packets could be directed to the wrong router interfaces. While observing the
system’s operation as a whole, we would detect incorrect packet flow behavior even though
monitoring the “processing” of the system would determine that the program execution in
an instruction-per-instruction basis is correct.
Overall, the processing monitor approach works well, but in terms of packet flow vali-
dation it is difficult to say anything detailed about the behavior of a complex piece of code.
It can only be done at a level where rules are very lose. This problem is closely related
to the lack of modularity in the processing monitor. Therefore, we propose a modular
approach for verifying data-path processing.
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 Figure 6.11. Modular Processing Verification
6.6.1.2 Modular Verification
We develop a scalable solution which uses both a processing monitor and an I/O mon-
itor per module. We refer to Click as our example router architecture, because the system
is already divided in individual packet processing modules (elements). Different elements
implement simple router functions, which can be combined to one graph and build a com-
plete and extendable router configuration. The power of this approach lies in the “user’s”
ability to combine modules into arbitrary graphs where packets proceed along one path
through the graph.
In order to verify the correct operation of the system as a whole we need to : 1) verify
the execution path of every element by using a processing monitor per element [8] which
tracks all the individual instructions executed on the processor while the particular element
is active and 2) use one I/O monitor that tracks the processing times of all packets on all
elements and uses a mathematical model to judge if the overall processing in the system is
correct. The two types of monitors are shown in Figure 6.11.
The high level idea regarding the operation of the I/O monitor is the following:
 We profile the processing time that each packet spends in each element
 We draw one histogram per element that depicts the distribution of the processing
time values
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 We normalize the histogram to plot the probability density function (pdf) of process-
ing times per element
 We find a mathematical way to combine the pdfs of individual elements and cre-
ate a model of the expected processing time distribution of the system as a whole
(distribution Xconv)
 The next step is to profile the processing time that each time spends across all ele-
ments and create the probability density function of overall processing times (distri-
bution Xall)
 Finally, we compare Xconv and Xall, and use a statistical metric to decide whether
they are matching or not
The interesting part of the I/O monitor is that we base our decision of what normal
processing should look like on the unique processing characteristics of every element. The
results from profiling the element’s processing times will solely depend on the functionality
of the element and will thus help us determine if the system encounters any unusual delays
while processing the packets.
6.6.1.3 Port-to-Port Packet Flow
In this section, we describe the mathematical basis of the I/O monitor in a more formal
way.
Let’s assume that we have n processing elements m1 : : :mn. The overall functionality
of the router is represented by a graph connecting these elements. Graph G = (M;E)
consists of a set of all elements,M , and a set of directed edges, E, indicating that transition
of traffic between elements is allowed. For simplicity of our discussion, we assume that all
packets enter processing at node m1 and leave processing at node mn. Let (mi) denote
the arrival rate of traffic a modulemi. The departure rate at modulemi is denoted by (mi).
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Figure 6.12. Validating Packet Flow on Node m.
To determine the characteristics of traffic at a node mi, we determine all paths that
can lead from the input to that node. Let p(mi1 ;mi2 ; : : : ;mim) denote a path from mi1 to
mim . Figure 6.12 shows an example network configuration and represents the introduced
notation more clearly.
Let Pim be the probability density function (pdf) of the processing time spent on node
mim. The total processing time distribution on every path to node mi can be computed by
convolving the processing time distributions on all individual nodes in that particular path:
Pi = Pi1  Pi2      Pim. If path i receives an fi percentage of the total traffic rate then
the pdf on that path is
Pm
i=1 fi  Pi. Taking the weighted sum of pdfs over all paths, we
can describe the expected processing time distribution of the system as a whole using the
following equation:
Pconv =
mX
i=1
fi  Pi (6.1)
If Pall denotes the pdf of the overall processing we can compare Pall to Pconv and
infer abnormal processing behavior at any element in the system. If an attacker targets
one of the elements and changes its processing, the change will reflect in the distribution
Pall, which will then become different from the modeled distribution Pconv and eventually
the I/O monitor will signal an attack. As we explain in Section 6.6.3, we can measure
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the difference between two probability distributions (and thus quantify a potential attack)
adopting the Kullback-Leibler divergence method as used in probability theory.
6.6.2 Illustration of Processing Time Distributions
In this section, we show an example of how to combine individual modules into graphs
and estimate the overall processing distribution function based on the convolution model
(joint work with Xinming Chen and Tilman Wolf). This example serves as proof that our
I/O monitor can validate processing correctly in case of normal processing conditions.
We use a test configuration on a Click modular router which consists of a single path of
seven modules: DropBroadcasts - Strip - CheckIPHeader - FixIPSrc - DecIPTTL - IPFrag-
menter - EtherEncap; These are randomly chosen simple functions of Click modular router
that either perform some kind of processing on the packets headers (e.g. modify the IPaddr,
TTL fields), delete some bytes from each packet, fragment large packets or drop certain
types of packets. We send a random packet trace to the router and profile the processing
time each packet spends in each of the above elements. Figure 6.13 shows the frequency
distributions of the seven elements. The horizontal axis denotes processing time (in CPU
cycles), while the vertical axis is normalized frequency.
The overall processing time distribution on the seven elements is shown in Figure 6.14.
The next step is to verify our mathematical model, so we compute the convolution of the
seven separate distributions (Figure 6.14 as well) and compare it to the total distribution.
As we can see, the two plots are very similar, which means we have a good mathematical
model that estimates the overall processing time distribution of a system.
6.6.3 Quantifying Changes in Processing
In the previous section we verified the operation of our I/O monitor in case all seven el-
ements do the “right” processing. Here, we intentionally change the behavior of the system
to create attack conditions and see how our I/O monitor works under attack. The expected
processing time distribution (computed using convolution) stays of course unchanged, but
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Figure 6.13. Processing Time Distributions for Elements 1-7
     Total Processing Time Distribution                                                  Convolution of Distributions (of 7 elements)     
 
-0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
x 104
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
               
-0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
x 104
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
 
                                          
Figure 6.14. Total Processing Time Distribution vs. Convoluted Distributions of 7 ele-
ments
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the overall processing time distribution (which is profiled) will change in case of an attack.
Let’s see how distributions change when we change one element’s processing behavior
(imitating possible attack behavior) and how we can quantify that change.
In this experiment, we use the same Click configuration: DropBroadcasts - Strip -
CheckIPHeader - FixIPSrc - DecIPTTL - IPFragmenter - EtherEncap, and a different ran-
dom packet trace. We modify the element DecIPTTL, by adding a variable number of
loops in the source code. In this way, we create various attack conditions ranging from
mild change in the processing to more aggressive changes; we experiment with zero to as
high as 1,000,000 loops of instructions.
As we mentioned before, a change in the processing time distribution (pdf) of the 5th
element will impact the overall processing time distribution plot of the system. The first
plot of Figure 6.15 shows the overall processing time distribution of the Click configuration
(which is profiled) in case no additional code is injected in the 5th element. We will take
that as our reference of “normal” processing behavior. The rest of the plots in Figure 6.15
show the overall processing time distributions in case we inject 100, 1000, 10,000 and
1,000,000 loops.
A careful visual comparison can show us some changes in processing. We can actually
identify differences slightly better if we plot the overall pdfs of the system as cdfs, as shown
in Figure 6.16. It is obvious that 1,000,000 injected loops of code can be easily detected,
but it becomes more difficult to detect 10,000-loop injection or less.
A formal way to quantify the changes in the overall processing distribution plots is to
measure the Kullback-Leibler divergence [44]. KL divergence is an approach that quan-
tifies in bits how close a probability distribution P is to a model distribution Q. Since our
distributions are non-symmetric the KL distance of P based on Q will be different than the
distance of Q based on P. Thus, we calculate the distance in both left-right and right-left
directions: DKL(P jjQ) + DKL(QjjP ). This metric can help us detect changes in pro-
cessing between the normal case and the abnormal cases depicted in Figure 6.15. Table
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Figure 6.15. Processing Time Distributions for Normal/Attack Cases
6.4 shows these distances and their standard error. The same distances are also plotted in
Figure 6.16. As expected, the more loops we insert in case A, the higher the KL-divergence
metric between the initial and the new processing time distributions. The way to interpret
these distances is by performing multiple experiments of normal and abnormal processing
cases and determining the threshold above which the two distributions will be considered
different and below which the difference will be considered small enough to fall into the
normal processing category. For example, in Figure 6.16 the cut-off threshold could be 0.5.
Anytime we compare a probability density function to the modeled one and they differ by
more than 0.5, we will assume that the system is under attack.
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Figure 6.16. CDFs of Different Distributions and KL-distance
Table 6.4. KL-Divergence of different processing scenarios
Attack vs Normal Processing Mean KLDiv Std KLDiv
No-loop vs No-loop (reference) 0.30 0.05
100-loop vs No-loop 0.37 0.07
1000-loop vs No-loop 0.40 0.06
10000-loop vs No-loop 0.94 0.09
1M-loop vs No-loop 1.30 0.12
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In the general case of a modular router that runs protocol code, we can have one extra
module calculate the KL-divergence metric to detect changes in the processing distribution.
Of course, every case is different, and we should carefully set the distance threshold that
will be the cut-off for normal processing. The complexity of the KL-divergence metric is
O(n), where n is the number of samples in the probability density function. This observation
makes us think that the implementation of the I/O monitor will not be prohibitive in terms
of performance overhead and that it is suitable for implementation in hardware, since it can
be parallelized.
6.6.4 I/O Monitor Complexity
In this section, we analyze the complexity of such a system. The I/O monitor pseudo-
code shown in Figure 6.17 performs the following steps:
 First of all, assumes a system with m modules and n samples of processing times
 Takes as input m arrays consisting of n profiled processing times, and the total pro-
cessing time distribution the the system as a whole (Q)
 Calculates the histogram of processing times per module (O(n+k) complexity per
module)
 Normalizes the histogram to produce the probability density function of every mod-
ule (O(n)complexity per module)
 Computes the convolution of the pdfs of the m modules (O(n*m) complexity overall)
 Compares the convoluted distribution to the given distribution Q, to check of pro-
cessing abnormalities
 The complexity of the KL-divergence metric used in the previous comparison is O(n)
Overall, we observe that we have a nested set of loops, one with m and one with n
repetitions. This gives a total complexity of O(m*n) for the I/O monitor. We can roughly
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Figure 6.17. Pseudo-code for I/O Monitor
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estimate around 50 instructions being executed inside the large loop. Assuming a typical
system of m=20 modules and taking n=10,000 samples of processing times per module,
our system will execute around 10M instructions. With a 100MHz processor, we can get
updates from the I/O monitor around every 100ms.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this chapter, we describe the conclusions of this dissertation and propose future di-
rections for our work.
7.1 Conclusions
The use of software-based packet processing in routers with general-purpose processing
engines is becoming more prevalent in the Internet. The use of software in the data plane
of the network presents a target for novel intrusion and denial-of-service attacks that can
have significant impact on the overall security of the network.
In our work, we have described and demonstrated a novel type of network attack, which
exploits vulnerabilities in the packet processing systems of modern routers. We show how
integer vulnerabilities in the implementation of a common protocol processing operation
can be used to execute arbitrary attack code. Our attack can be used to launch devastating
denial-of-service attacks in the core of the network.
We have also shown that defense mechanisms do exist. Our work presents the design
and prototype implementation of a secure packet processor that is equipped with a moni-
toring system that can detect such attacks. The monitoring system compares the operation
of the processor cores to the expected behavior that is obtained from analyzing the packet
processing binary. A processing monitor continuously checks the validity of processor op-
erations and triggers a recovery mechanism when deviations from expected behavior are
detected. The prototype implementation of our system can detect intrusion attacks within
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six processor cycles and recover the system in that time. The result from the prototype sys-
tem indicate that our design is an effective approach to protecting networking infrastructure
in the future Internet.
However, such defense methods are not currently deployed in the network. To our
knowledge, this work represents the first time a practical attack on the data plane of the
actual network infrastructure has been shown and thus provides an important step toward
understanding and correcting vulnerabilities in the network infrastructure.
7.2 Future Work
The new attack vector that was identified in this thesis, and the defense methods that
were proposed, are the beginning steps of our contribution to the field. This dissertation
opens up interesting questions in both network and embedded system security fields.
7.2.1 Networked Embedded Systems Security
Packet processors inside modern routers are just one example of networked embedded
devices. The vulnerabilities that routers are subject to can be applied to other areas where
programmable networked devices are used. For example, the design of systems in wireless
communications, health care or the power grid is shifting towards programmability because
of flexibility needs.
Figure 6.12 shows different domains where the use of networked embedded devices is
prevalent. Since these devices already communicate as large-scale cyber-physical systems,
we believe that there is a lot of scope in trying to identify potential vulnerabilities that can
affect their operation.
Critical characteristics of such embedded devices are the following:
 They form networks
 They can be attacked remotely
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 Figure 7.1. Networked Embedded Devices
 They are resource constrained
Judging from the characteristics of routing systems and our evidence of vulnerabilities
in the networking domain, we can expect devices in neighboring domains to become attack
targets. Exploring hardware/software co-design security solutions is essential for intercon-
nected embedded devices. The problem domain needs defenses that are light-weight, fast,
effective and can take advantage of parallelization (to be implemented in hardware), while
other type of attacks can be addressed using software based security mechanisms. In this
way, we can take advantage of the best of the two worlds - computing efficiency and high
throughput.
Some of the questions that are open in the greater area of cyber-physical systems are:
How can we design cyber-physical systems in a way that they are inherently secure? Or,
in case inherent security is not possible, what kind of security extensions will make them
secure?
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